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COMMENT
PHENOMENAL COSMIC POWERS, ITTY-BITTY LIVING SPACE:
ERISA-GOVERNED HEALTHCARE PLANS SEEKING “APPROPRIATE
EQUITABLE RELIEF” AGAINST WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
SETTLEMENTS
William Baker†
ABSTRACT
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
safeguards the financial well-being and equitable administration of
employer-provided benefit plans but also interferes with the ability of
employees to obtain workers’ compensation benefits in some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has allowed employers to weaponize ERISA’s remedy
provisions, giving ERISA plan administrators an unfettered ability to enforce
the private law of fringe benefit contracts with the power of federal statute.
ERISA authorizes a cause of action, enforceable exclusively in federal
court, for plan administrators to obtain appropriate equitable relief to
enforce the terms of the plan. One term contained in most employerprovided health care plans requires a person who has received benefits under
the plan to reimburse the plan for any benefits paid in the event of any
recovery from a third party. The Supreme Court has decided four cases where
a plan sought reimbursement from a plan participant who received a thirdparty tort settlement. These decisions gave employers the ability to create
one-sided plan terms. The employee carries the burden of paying all the costs
of obtaining a third-party recovery, while ERISA preemption removes any
state-law obstacles to a plan’s ability to receive full reimbursement.
An ERISA plan can seek similarly unencumbered reimbursement from
workers’ compensation benefits paid by the employer or its insurer. Workers’
compensation benefits are calculated to pay just enough to keep an injured
worker from destitution. But an obligation to reimburse the full amount of
past medical treatment can prevent an employee from obtaining any real
relief in the event of a disputed compensation claim. An employee desiring
health care coverage from an employer is faced with an unforeseeable
Hobson’s choice: either to forego a chance at obtaining workers’
compensation benefits if the entitlement is arguable or to reject the adhesion

† J.D. Candidate 2020, Liberty University School of Law. Many thanks to B. Patrick Agnew
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116

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

contract of the employer’s health plan and forego any premium-sharing
fringe benefit.
This result cannot be what Congress intended when enacting ERISA in
order to protect employee benefits. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
“appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA has little equity in it. Granting
equitable relief to an employer-funded health plan must account for the full
bargain between the employee and employer, a bargain that includes the
obligation of the employer to provide compensation benefits to employees
injured in the line of duty. The maxims of equity require no less.
Equitable relief under ERISA should be tempered by proper contractual
construction, whether as written or as reformed. Relief could also take the
form of estoppel: holding an ERISA plan to the terms of a settlement between
the employee and employer, or to the background of state law that formed
the basis of the employment relationship. A final option would be Congress
amending ERISA’s remedies provisions, wiping clean the slate of tortuous
judicial interpretation, and leveling the playing field under ERISA for
employers and employees.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1974, President Ford signed the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) into law. Upon signing, he said, “It is
certainly appropriate that this law be signed on Labor Day, since this act
marks a brighter future for almost all the men and women of our labor
force.”1 The “almost” is somewhat surprising—after all, President Kennedy
did not say “We choose to go most of the way to the moon”2—but it was also
prescient. Some of the labor force’s men and women whose futures ERISA
has not made brighter are injured workers whose compensation claims are
disputed.
In all fifty states, workers’ compensation acts obligate employers to pay
medical expenses and a portion of lost wages to employees who suffer a workrelated injury or an occupational disease.3 Often, the employer controverts a
1. 1 RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:1 (October 2018 update)
(citing Remarks by President Gerald Ford on the Signing of HR 2, (Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829), The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Related White House and Labor
Department Documents (Sept. 2, 1974), reprinted in 1974 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No 1, at R-1 (Sept.
16, 1974)).
2. John F. Kennedy, Remarks of the President, Rice University Stadium, Houston, Texas
3 (Sept. 12, 1962), in Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary (Sept. 12, 1962)
(on file with the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum).
3. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
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compensation claim and must file a notice with the state’s administrative
agency.4 Around 90% of claims are disposed of without proceeding to a
formal contest—usually by agreement or settlement between the employee
and employer.5 By the very nature of a settlement, the agreed-upon amount
is “apt to be less than the full statutory amount” of benefits.6 For many
employees, the story does not end there.
If an employee’s health coverage paid any medical expenses, the health
plan might seek reimbursement from the workers’ compensation settlement
proceeds. If the health plan is maintained by the employer, it is governed by
ERISA.7 Because of a series of Supreme Court rulings, and as long as the plan
terms so provide, the ERISA-governed health plan (ERISA plan) can obtain
reimbursement from the full amount of the settlement, regardless of how
much of that settlement actually represents past medical expenses.8 Because
even a full award of statutory workers’ compensation benefits are intended
only to keep injured workers from destitution9 and because a settlement is,
by definition, an amount less than a full award, an ERISA plan’s uninhibited
right to reimbursement can prevent an injured employee from obtaining
practical relief.
While scholarly criticism of ERISA abounds, little attention has been given
to the problems ERISA plan reimbursement presents to a workers’
compensation claimant.10 While overlooked, the problem has the potential to
be pervasive because ERISA governs most private-sector health plans.11 In
2013, the Supreme Court issued its ruling allowing employers merely to
insert plan language and thereby trump any defense that would reduce the
4. Id. § 126.01.
5. Id. § 132.01.
6. Id. § 132.03.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. 13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.01 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory
Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers' Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Kristen S. Cross et al., ERISA-Governed Healthcare Liens, 78 ALA. LAW. 346,
349 (2017); Jonathan M. Feigenbaum, Summary Overview of Short-Term-Disability Benefits,
Long-Term-Disability Benefits and Co-Ordination with Other Benefits and Settlements Under
the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, MASS. EMP. LAWS. ASS’N (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.erisaattorneys.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/MELA-STD-LTDPresentation.pdf; Jill Bollwek, ERISA Health Plan Reimbursement in Workers’ Compensation
Cases, MO. DEP’T LAB., https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/Understanding-and-ResolvingERISA-Handout.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
11. Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/healthplans (last visited Dec. 2, 2018).
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amount reimbursed to reflect either the cost of obtaining a settlement or a
claimant’s true recovery.12 As more plans adopt favorable language, the
number of injured workers unable to obtain practical relief will grow. A local
workers’ compensation attorney has had several cases where an ERISA plan
asserts a full right to recovery against a compromise settlement—sometimes
years after the settlement agreement is made—and attests that many of his
colleagues have faced similar situations.13
Part I sets forth the issue. Part II explains generally how workers’
compensation works: its origin and rationale, the basis and extent of
compensation benefits, and some procedural aspects of compensation
claims. Part II also explains why ERISA was enacted and how Congress made
its enforcement an exclusively federal matter. Part III walks through a series
of Supreme Court cases that provide a framework for how an employerprovided healthcare plan may use ERISA’s remedies provisions to enforce its
right of reimbursement. Part IV explores how an injured worker may
effectively be unable to obtain relief due to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of ERISA’s remedies. Part V interprets how the Supreme
Court’s reimbursement framework might apply differently when a plan seeks
reimbursement against a workers’ compensation settlement rather than
against a third-party tort recovery. Part VI proposes solutions for how to
equitably resolve the injured worker’s dilemma.
II. BACKGROUND
The particular problem at issue arises at the intersection of workers’
compensation schemes and ERISA. The substance and purpose of both are
set forth below.
A.

Workers’ Compensation Insurance

Worker’s compensation acts are state laws14 that mostly came into effect
in the early twentieth century.15 After Hawai’i adopted its system in 1963, all
states have now enacted compensation acts.16 Soon after, a doomed attempt

12. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013).
13. Interview with B. Patrick Agnew, partner at Agnew, Johnson & Rosenberger, PLLC,
in Lynchburg, Va. (Feb. 7, 2019).
14. An exception is the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. §§
901–950.
15. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.07 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
16. Id. § 2.08.
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was made at imposing at least some uniform standards at the federal level.17
There are legislative and administrative differences between every state’s
compensation scheme,18 but they are largely similar.
Essentially, workers’ compensation acts automatically entitle an employee
who suffers a “personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment” or an “occupational disease” to certain benefits.19 Employees
are covered, but workers classified as independent contractors are not.20
Entitlement to compensation is a form of strict liability: the test of liability is
not the negligence or fault of the parties, but whether the injury is connected
with the employment.21
The strict liability plan of compensation schemes later became known as
a “grand bargain”22 between employers and laborers. In the grand bargain,
employees gave up their right to any claim of negligence against their
employers in order to receive automatic medical and wage benefits (the
“exclusive remedy” provision).23 Employers gave up common-law defenses
that would have protected them against an action by employees, such as
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine,
in order to reduce liability exposure to only lost wages and medical care.24
The underlying social theory is to provide “fixed, certain and speedy” relief
“at a time when most needed”25 to provide support and prevent destitution.26
This grand bargain has reverberations throughout the whole of
compensation acts and administration. Workers’ compensation awards
wage-loss benefits, not in full, but between half and two-thirds of the
employee’s average weekly wage.27 Wage-loss benefits are also subject to

17. Id. (describing the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws,
which submitted its report in July 1972).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1.01.
20. Id.
21. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
22. See, e.g., Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 404 P.3d 44, 46–47 (Okla. 2017).
23. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
24. Id.
25. Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 135 S.E. 890, 891 (Va. 1926).
26. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.02 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory
Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers’ Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997).
27. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 1.01, 1.03 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
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arbitrary limits, or caps, so as to prevent malingering.28 Claims are handled
administratively in almost all states.29 Relaxed rules of procedure and
evidence apply: compared to a trial court, discovery is more expansive
regarding medical information, but otherwise more restrictive.30 While the
social policy motivating compensation law ignores the concept of fault long
enough to get the injured worker relief, workers’ compensation does not
exonerate every at-fault party.31 An employee cannot pursue relief against the
employer but may do so against a third party.32 If an employee does recover
against a third party, the employer typically has a right to receive its outlay
from the employee, preventing double recovery by the employee.33
While compensation acts are creatures of state governments, the
compensation system is a private one, composed of transactions between
employers, insurance carriers, and employees.34 All states require employers
to secure their compensation liability, though the permissible means vary
significantly, and all but two states allow self-insurance.35 Although the cost
of providing workers’ compensation is to be borne by the employer “as a part
of the expense of the business,”36 the consumers of the products or services
created by the employer ultimately bear the cost of this grand bargain.37
The final relevant aspect of compensation law is what happens when a
compensation claim is disputed. Though relief is to be “swift and sure,”38 the
claimant must still prove either an “injury by accident” or an “occupational
disease” “arising out of” and incurred “in the course of” employment.39 These
28. Id. § 1.03.
29. 11 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 124.01 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
30. J. Randolph Ward, Primary Issues in Compensation Litigation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV.
443, 444 (1995).
31. 10 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 110.01 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
32. See, e.g., Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 149 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Va. 2001) (applying
Virginia law); Smith v. Payne, 753 P.2d 1162 (Ariz. 1988); Chesapeake Haven Land Corp. v.
Litzenberg, 785 A.2d 859 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
33. 10 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 110.02 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
34. Id.
35. 14 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 150.01 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
36. Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 135 S.E. 890, 891 (Va. 1926).
37. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
38. Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 295 S.E.2d 458, 460 (N.C. 1982).
39. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
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elements, while illuminated by state case law, provide plenty of room for
dispute, and result in the practical reality that a claimant might need to obtain
an attorney. The grand ideal of compensation law is that benefits issue
automatically once statutory prerequisites are met.40 But because
compensation involves complex issues (with the need to sift through state
case law and evidentiary problems), a claimant has the right to counsel.41 In
most states, a claimant’s attorney’s fee is deducted from the award, which
might be seen as a necessary evil because it reduces an award already
calculated to provide minimum support.42 An attorney’s ability to obtain
higher awards and settlements, and a better likelihood of prevailing, offset
that reduction of relief.43
B.

ERISA-Governed Healthcare Plans

Unlike workers’ compensation coverage, healthcare plans do not arise by
operation of a statute. Health benefits, like any other fringe benefit, arise by
contract between employee and employer. If an employer offers a healthcare
benefit plan, it is governed by ERISA.44 While the “retirement” in ERISA’s
name suggests a relation to retirement, its regulatory reach extends to all
employer-maintained benefit plans. ERISA came about because of the poor
financial decisions of the American company Studebaker in the early 1960s.
1.

The Purpose of ERISA

After the Studebaker-Packard Corporation closed its South Bend, Indiana,
auto manufacturing plant, many thousands of employees soon discovered
that the company’s pension plan was essentially nonexistent.45 The scandal of
40. 13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.05 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2018).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 133.01.
43. “[I]t is unrealistic to expect that workers will receive prompt, equitable, and adequate
benefits, or anything approaching them, if they are left without the opportunity to obtain legal
representation. Even if defense attorneys were also eliminated, there would remain the need
of inexperienced claimants for assistance in having to contend with professionals [insurance
company employees] on issues arising under a complicated and unfamiliar law.” 13 LEX K.
LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.05 n.7 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.
2018) (alterations in original) (quoting National Comm’n on State Workmen’s Comp. Laws,
Compendium on Workmen’s Compensation, ch. 13, at 212 (1973)).
44. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 136 (2009).
45. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683–84
(2001).
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Studebaker’s employees losing pensions that they had spent their careers
earning was the political motivation for federal pension reform.46
The broad and detailed declaration of congressional policy for ERISA
provides “that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to
the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit]
plans” and that “minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable
character of such plans and their financial soundness.”47 Though prompted
by pension reform, ERISA governs not only pension plans but also “any plan,
fund, or program . . . maintained by an employer . . . for the purpose of
providing . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, [or] disability.”48 ERISA covers most privatesector health plans.49 Plans maintained solely for workers’ compensation
coverage are not covered by ERISA.50 ERISA established procedural
standards for reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility for these
employee welfare benefit plans, but does not regulate the substantive content
of the plans.51 ERISA plans typically designate an administrator, though the
employer is the default by statute, and the administrator is “generally an alterego of the employer.”52
2.

Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction of ERISA

Federal courts have confirmed that Congress “intended that a body of
Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.”53
Congress did so by, inter alia, providing statutory causes of action

46. Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2017).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017).
49. Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/healthplans (last accessed Dec. 28, 2018).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2017).
51. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2017); Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head,
No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 520
(2015).
53. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980).
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enumerated in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a),54 exclusive federal jurisdiction for all
actions brought under ERISA Title I,55 and broad preemption of state law.
ERISA’s preemption clause provides that “the provisions of this
title . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”56 The Supreme Court has
given ERISA broad preemptive power, holding that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an
employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan.”57 The “insurance savings clause,”58 a major exception to state-law
preemption, specifies that state laws regulating insurance, banking, or
securities survive ERISA preemption.59 But those surviving state laws do not
reach ERISA-governed plans that are funded by the employer as opposed to
merely insured. This route to preemption, under ERISA’s “deemer clause,”60
is gaining significance as more employers create self-funded plans to avoid
state regulation.61 The Supreme Court case FMC Corp. v. Holliday illustrates
the interaction of these preemption provisions.62 In Holliday, the Court
found that ERISA preempted a state anti-subrogation law that prohibited
reimbursement of healthcare benefits from a claimant’s tort recovery.63 The
state law survived preemption thanks to ERISA’s insurance savings clause but
54. Each cause of action authorized under the statute describes the proper plaintiff.
Potential plaintiffs consist of four groups: plan participants, plan beneficiaries, plan
fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor. David M. Cook & Karen M. Wahle, Procedural Aspects
of Litigating ERISA Claims, A.B.A. (2000), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/
papers/2000/wahle.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2017). There is one exception wherein an action brought under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits under the terms of a plan may be filed in state or
federal court.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2017).
57. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2017).
59. Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the Deemer
Clause As Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307,
308 (1997).
60. The clause provides that “an employee benefit plan . . . shall [not] be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer . . . in the business of insurance . . . for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(2017). Any healthcare plan “established or maintained by an employer” is an employee
benefit plan under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2017).
61. Secunda, supra note 44, at 131, 145 (citing COLLEEN MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 307 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that in 2006, 55% of
workers with employer-sponsored healthcare coverage were participants in a partially or fully
employer-funded plan)).
62. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
63. Id. at 65.
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ultimately did not benefit the claimant because the law, as applied to a selffunded plan, fell within ERISA’s deemer clause.64
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON ERISA REMEDIES FOR PLAN
REIMBURSEMENT
A series of Supreme Court cases provides a framework for the right of an
ERISA plan to seek reimbursement for medical expenses paid to a plan
participant (i.e., participating employee) who later receives a collateral
recovery for those expenses. Scholars have been critical of both the reasoning
and the consequences of those rulings, not least because Congress may never
have intended what the Court has imputed to it.
A.

Appropriate Equitable Relief—Mertens and Its Progeny

ERISA itself has no provision granting covered plans a right of
subrogation or reimbursement. ERISA does provide a cause of action
authorizing a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary “to obtain . . . appropriate
equitable relief . . . to enforce any . . . terms of the plan,” also known as the
“catchall provision.”65
1.

ERISA Authorizes Only “Equitable” Relief

In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, a pension plan sponsor defaulted on some
benefits.66 The injured beneficiaries pursued compensatory damages under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary, an actuarial firm, for willingly
participating in an ERISA-specified fiduciary’s breach of duty.67 The Supreme
Court skirted the certified question regarding nonfiduciary liability in
holding that “equitable” relief under ERISA did not authorize consequential
monetary damages.68 Justice Scalia, for the majority, wrote that the term
“equitable relief” refers to the “categories of relief that were typically available
in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution).”69 Because
compensatory damages were the classic form of legal, as opposed to equitable
relief, ERISA’s catchall provision did not authorize them.70 The struggle to

64. Morrissey, supra note 59, at 309–10.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2017).
66. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COL. L. REV. 1317, 1348–49 (2003).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1349–50.
69. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
70. Id. at 248.
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determine what relief sought under ERISA falls in an equitable category
began with Mertens.
2.

Reimbursement of Health Plans Under ERISA

Next, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Mertens conception of equitable relief as
encompassing the forms of relief typically available in equity.71 The Court
established a two-prong test for whether a plaintiff seeks “equitable relief”
under ERISA: both “‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the
underlying remedies sought” must be equitable.72 In order to satisfy those
prongs, Justice Scalia recommended consulting standard current works on
equity.73 Great-West sought an injunction to compel the payment of money
past due under a contract.74 The basis for that claim was not equitable, but
legal.75 Great-West alternatively sought restitution, which it characterized as
equitable relief.76 The Court held that restitution could be either legal or
equitable; the nature of the remedy sought by Great-West was not equitable
because it sought personal liability and not a lien against a particular fund.77
The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Sereboff expanded healthcare plans’
power to receive reimbursement.78 The Sereboffs suffered injuries from an
auto accident, and Mid Atlantic paid their medical expenses under a plan
covered by ERISA.79 After the Sereboffs settled a tort suit with third parties,
Mid Atlantic sued the Sereboffs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) to enforce the
“Acts of Third Parties” reimbursement provision in the plan.80 Pending
outcome of the suit, the Sereboffs set aside the amount claimed in an
investment account.81 The Sereboff Court distinguished Great-West on the
ground that in Great-West, the funds claimed were in a trust and not in the
defendant’s possession.82 Instead, the Court relied on Barnes v. Alexander83
71. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002).
72. Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 217.
74. Id. at 210.
75. Id. at 211.
76. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002).
77. Id. at 212–14.
78. Kristin L. Huffaker, Where the Windfall Falls Short: “Appropriate Equitable Relief”
after Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 61 OKLA. L. REV. 233, 234 (2008).
79. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 362.
83. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914).
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in holding that Mid Atlantic’s claim was indistinguishable from an “equitable
lien by agreement” and that Mid Atlantic could “follow” a portion of the
recovery into the Sereboffs’ hands as soon as the fund was identified.84 Thus,
the Sereboff decision authorized healthcare plans to assert any right of
reimbursement provided for by the plan terms against any “specifically
identifiable” funds that are “within the possession and control” of the
participant.85
Next, the Supreme Court decided US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, where a
health plan pursued reimbursement of $66,866 from a participant who
received $66,000 after subtraction of the attorney’s fee from a third-party
settlement.86 McCutchen argued that unjust enrichment principles should
reduce the plan’s recovery.87 Specifically, McCutchen contended that in
equity, an insurer could recover no more than an insured’s “double
recovery”: that which was received from the third party that compensated for
the same loss as the insurance already covered.88 McCutchen also argued that
the “common-fund doctrine” should apply, reducing the amount paid to the
insurer by the proportion of the attorney’s fee, and therefore accurately
reflect the cost of obtaining the recovery.89 The Court followed Sereboff in
holding that the agreement itself (the ERISA plan’s terms) governs since the
nature of the lien was an “equitable lien by agreement.”90 The plan term
requiring reimbursement was as follows:
If [US Airways] pays benefits for any claim you incur as the
result of negligence, willful misconduct, or other actions of
a third party, . . . [y]ou will be required to reimburse [US
Airways] for amounts paid for claims out of any monies
recovered from [the] third party, including, but not limited
to, your own insurance company as the result of judgment,
settlement, or otherwise.91
But even though the terms of the plan will control subrogation rights and
defenses, the silence of the plan may allow equitable defenses, such as the
84. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2006).
85. Id. at 362–63.
86. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 92 (2013).
87. Id. at 95–96.
88. Id.
89. Id. The common-fund doctrine is supposed to prevent freeloading. T. Leigh Anenson,
Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 659, 666 n.17 (2018).
90. McCutchen, 569 U.S. at 98.
91. Id. at 92 (alterations in original).
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common-fund doctrine, as an appropriate default understanding of the
parties’ intent.92
The effect of McCutchen was dramatic. If the plan terms so provide (and
after McCutchen there is no reason why they would not),93 an ERISA plan
administrator is armed with a right to reimbursement enforceable solely in
federal court. That reimbursement is not subject to reduction by either state
laws restricting subrogation nor by equitable defenses that reflect the reality
of the cost of obtaining a settlement.
3.

Right of Reimbursement Against a Workers’ Compensation
Settlement

A health plan can seek reimbursement from a workers’ compensation
settlement.94 In an unpublished decision, a federal trial court followed
Holliday in finding that ERISA preempted a state law prohibiting health
plans from imposing a lien against workers’ compensation awards.95
Although decided before McCutchen, the court in Tackett used the same
reasoning in holding that the terms of the plan control, and that the term at
issue was “crystal clear.”96 The plan term at issue was as follows:
[A] plan participant must repay plan benefits when “you or
your covered Dependent achieve any recovery
whatsoever, through a legal action or settlement in
connection with any sickness or Injury alleged to have been
caused by a third party, regardless of whether or not some or
all of the amount recovered was specifically for the Medical
or Dental expenses for which Plan benefits were paid[.]”97
Although the settlement documents stipulated that no portion of the
settlement represented payment for medical expenses, the court found that
the $105,000 settlement undercut that representation and that the language

92. Id. at 101–102.
93. “Federal case law has provided plan sponsors of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) covered plans with the ability to insert plan provisions that are
more favorable to the plan sponsor rather than the plan participant or beneficiary.” Kathryn
J. Kennedy, Protective Plan Provisions for Employer-Sponsored Employee Benefit Plans, 18
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1, 1 (2016).
94. Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-cv-0123-MJR,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38121 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008).
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *7–8 (alteration in original).
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was an attempt to circumvent the plan’s lien.98 The court regretted that the
reimbursement caused the injured workers to receive less money for their
injuries, but said that the situation could have been avoided if the health plan
had been invited to the negotiation table.99 The Employer’s Guide to SelfInsuring Health Benefits noted that this decision adds workers’ compensation
awards to the types of funds accessible to reimbursement actions.100
This line of Supreme Court decisions has practical ramifications for
workers’ compensation claimants. The claimant must entice the ERISA plan
administrator to the negotiation table along with the employer and workers’
compensation insurer. If the ERISA plan does not agree to abide by the
settlement’s allocation of past medical expenses, it has a Supreme-Courtapproved right to recover against the full settlement proceeds, an amount
that might be significantly reduced by a claimant’s need for speedy relief to
feed hungry mouths at home. While the settlement’s allocation of past
medical expenses in Tackett was plainly a sham,101 the Supreme Court gives
a more honest claimant no greater likelihood of protection.
B.

Scholarly Criticism of the Supreme Court’s Framework

Many scholars have been critical of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
“equitable relief” under ERISA. A more colorful critic, Professor Secunda,
wrote that the Mertens definition of “equitable relief” led to fifteen years of
Supreme Court cases that were “bizarre and contrary to the original purposes
of ERISA.”102
1.

A High Court Schism

Professor Secunda described a decades-long Supreme Court battle,
beginning in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, between a
literalist approach, strictly limiting ERISA remedies based on structural
arguments, and a remedialist approach, seeking to establish ordinary trust
law as the touchstone for ERISA’s remedies.103 Professor Muir, whose work
on ERISA remedies was cited in Great-West,104 gave a milder reproach when
98. Id. at *9.
99. Id. at *11.
100. EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (2019).
101. Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-CV-0123-MJR,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38121, at *9 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008).
102. Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA,
61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 149 (2009).
103. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Secunda, supra note 102, at
159–60.
104. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–213, 215 (2002).
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she said that evaluating whether a remedy was typically available in equity is
a “quixotic mission.”105 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Great-West, criticized
the literalist majority as “exhum[ing] . . . an ancient classification unrelated
to the substance of the relief sought; and . . . obstruct[ing] the general goals
of ERISA.”106
Following Great-West, Professor Langbein wrote an oft-cited article
criticizing the literalists’ approach to “equitable relief.”107 His criticism had
two parts: first, the Supreme Court fumbled its technical understanding of
historical equity practice, and second, the Court ignored Congress’s
intention to subject covered plans to pre-existing trust law. In Mertens,
Justice Scalia listed injunction, mandamus, and restitution as the typical
categories of equitable relief, but he was obliged to walk back that
characterization of restitution in Great-West, while mandamus was
exclusively a legal remedy—“a gaping historical error.”108 Professor Langbein
explained that Congress made every benefit plan a trust, specified the ways
in which a person becomes a fiduciary thereof, described the essentials of
fiduciary law, and created the means for federal courts to develop a common
law of ERISA plans,109 only for its remedies, which track traditional trust
remedies, to be gutted by restrictive Court decisions.110
Professor Secunda cataloged some glaring instances of particularly unjust
results from the intersection of ERISA’s preemption provisions and judicial
interpretation of its remedial provisions.111 For example, in Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., a patient with a high-risk pregnancy was denied an
extended hospital stay by her health plan against the recommendation of her
doctor.112 After she returned home, she lost the baby.113 She and her husband
filed a wrongful death lawsuit based on the negligence of the health plan,
which the defendants removed to federal court on ERISA preemption
grounds.114 The Fifth Circuit held that the only possible remedy was a benefits
105. Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM.
BUS. L.J. 599, 624 (2018).
106. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224.
107. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003).
108. Id. at 1321.
109. Id. at 1324–33.
110. Id. at 1355.
111. Secunda, supra note 102, at 155–58.
112. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992), abrogated on
other grounds by Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1324–25.
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eligibility determination under ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B), and that
compensatory and punitive damages were wholly unavailable.115
2.

The Drafter’s Intent as to ERISA Remedies

Statements from individuals involved in creating ERISA have suggested
that the Supreme Court’s convoluted pronouncements of “equitable” relief
are merely due to clumsy drafting. Frank Cummings, counsel for the Senate
Labor Committee and involved with early drafts of ERISA,116 criticized the
Mertens decision when he said “we knew damn well you could get money in
equity” because he practiced in Maryland before the merger of law and
equity.117 Robert Nagle, the General Counsel of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare during the period before the passage of ERISA,118
said:
[ERISA] Section 502(a)(3)119 . . . was clearly intended . . . to
provide any sort of appropriate relief. . . . [D]rafting
carelessness gave Scalia the opening to do what he
did. . . . [I]t was an inadvertent mistake. If anybody had said
in our drafting group, “wait a minute, we’ve got legal and
equitable everywhere else, let’s put . . .” we would have said,
“of course.” I mean there was no intention whatsoever to
restrict the sort of relief.120
Regardless of what the drafters intended, a party seeking recovery under
an ERISA cause of action must hew to Supreme Court guidance on available
remedies.
3.

A Refined Understanding of Great-West’s Two-Prong Test

In Great-West, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for
whether a plaintiff seeks “equitable relief” under ERISA: both “‘the basis for
[the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the underlying remedies sought”

115. Id. at 1338.
116. Panel 1: Setting the Stage: History Before the Ninety-Third Congress, 6 DREXEL L. REV.
265, 267 & n. 3 (2014).
117. Panel 4: ERISA and the Fiduciary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 359, 374 (2014).
118. Panel 2: Making Sausage—the Ninety-Third Congress and ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV.
291, 296 (2014).
119. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
120. Panel 6: Benefit Disputes and Enforcement Under ERISA, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 409, 421–
22 (2014).
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must be equitable.121 Professor Muir sheds some light on this test by
discussing an exploration of fifteen years of Supreme Court equity cases
conducted by Professor Bray.122 The Court gradually shifted in its law of
remedies over eleven different cases during that timeframe, including GreatWest, Sereboff, and McCutchen.123 According to Professor Bray, the historical
investigation encouraged by the Court is “a fool’s errand.”124 The
fundamental questions the Court answers are “Is the requested relief
equitable?” and “What principles shape the availability of equitable relief?”125
Professor Muir applies this understanding to Great-West’s test: the “nature
of the underlying remed[y]” prong asks whether the requested relief is
equitable, and the “basis of the claim” prong asks what principles shape the
availability of equitable relief.126
The Supreme Court has not applied its two-prong test consistently in each
successive case.127 Rather than using its own test as a test, the Court has used
it as a sandbox to “construct[] an idealized history of equity.”128 However,
Professor Bray considers this to be good jurisprudence:129 it allows a middle
ground between Justice Scalia’s historical and unpersuasive “static
approach”130 and Justice Ginsburg’s unhelpful appeal to the “grand aims of
equity.”131 By exploring whether the nature of the underlying remedy sought
is equitable, or stated another way, whether the requested relief is equitable,
relief under ERISA’s remedies provisions can be shaped according to
equitable principles.
IV. AN INJURED WORKER’S QUAGMIRE
Although the Supreme Court has dealt four times with reimbursement of
an ERISA plan in the context of a third-party tort recovery,132 it is unlikely to

121. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
122. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015);
Muir, supra note 105, at 650–53.
123. Bray, supra note 122, at 999.
124. Id. at 1016–17.
125. Id. at 1008.
126. Muir, supra note 105, at 650–53.
127. Id. at 650.
128. Bray, supra note 122, at 1014.
129. Id. at 1020.
130. Id. at 1019.
131. Id. at 1012.
132. Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651,
656 (2016); US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 92 (2013); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
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revisit the issue in the context of a workers’ compensation claim. A contested
compensation claim subject to reimbursement by an ERISA plan is unlikely
to go to a trial, let alone go through the several appeals needed to clarify or
refine Supreme Court precedents in the specific context of a workers’
compensation settlement. Workers’ compensation relief is not a windfall. A
looming ERISA lien compounds the risks, delays, and expenses that might
make the difference between the time when relief is most needed and when
relief might come too late.
A.

The Difficulty of Obtaining Relief

A diligent lawyer will generally avoid settling one lawsuit only to expose a
client to another. Therefore, a lawyer should inquire into any obligation to
reimburse a healthcare plan before resolving a compensation claim. This
inquiry broadly involves three steps.133 First, if medical expenses have already
been paid, the lawyer should determine whether ERISA governs the
healthcare plan; if the plan is employer-provided, then ERISA likely covers
it.134 Second, the lawyer must “determine how the [ERISA] plan is funded,”
requiring investigation into ERISA-mandated federal filings.135 Funding is
relevant to determine whether relevant state law is preempted.136 Third, the
lawyer should investigate the healthcare plan’s terms by issuing an ERISA
document request to determine the extent of the right of subrogation or
reimbursement and whether common-law equitable defenses have been
exempted by the plan.137 Guidance for plan drafters urges “explicit
subrogation and reimbursement rights” along with the refutation of any
common-law equitable defenses.138 After McCutchen, there is a significant
incentive for the employer to include such provisions in the plan, with no
downside.139
If the lawyer has found an obligation on the part of the client to reimburse
the plan, obtaining a settlement involves a calculation that has very little
Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 360 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 207 (2002).
133. Kristen S. Cross et al., ERISA-Governed Healthcare Liens, 78 ALA. LAW. 346, 349
(2017).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 60–64.
137. Cross, supra note 133, at 349.
138. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Protective Plan Provisions for Employer-Sponsored Employee
Benefit Plans, 18 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1, 49 (2016); EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO
SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (database updated Mar. 2016).
139. Kennedy, supra note 138, at 48–49.
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margin. As part of the “grand bargain” underlying the compensation system,
a claimant’s recovery consists solely of medical benefits and wage-loss
benefits.140 If the potential medical benefits are subject to reimbursement
without reduction, then the potential recovery for wage-loss benefits alone
must cover all the expenses involved in making a claim. Those expenses
include the costs of the action, such as medical witness fees.141 Expenses also
include, in effect, any reduction in recovery due to a settlement.142 They must
also include an attorney’s fee, whether paid as a contingency from a
settlement or as a statutorily set amount from an award of benefits.143
Finally, the client needs to have something left over to compensate, at least
partially, for the loss sustained. Even before deducting the expenses of
bringing a claim, wage-loss benefits merely keep an injured worker from
destitution.144 Furthermore, a claimant’s pre-injury average weekly wage
dictates any wage-loss benefits, so the margin is even smaller for a lowerwage claimant.145 Under the weight of the costs of an action, the price of an
attorney, and the inherent compromise of a settlement, a claimant who is
obligated to pay an unreduced reimbursement to a healthcare plan is less
likely to receive any real compensation. The claimant will be unable to obtain
a settlement and is left only with the risk of an all-or-nothing award decision.
Furthermore, if an appeal after the initial compensation hearing and decision
becomes necessary, then the prospect of a positive outcome becomes even
more marginal, and an appeal less likely. Therefore, a compensation claimant
will probably never come before the Supreme Court, and lower courts are left
with the black-and-white logic of McCutchen: the plan terms exclusively
control whether a reimbursement can be reduced.
B.

An Employee Should Not Be Punished for Having a Disputable Claim

A claimant described in the above section suffers a significant possibility
that wage-loss benefits will be unrecoverable merely because some aspect of
the claim is disputable, and an administrator has denied compensation
benefits. But if the claimant has already had healthcare expenses paid, should
140. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.
141. 13 Lex K. Larson, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 134.01, 134.02, 134.03
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
142. Id. at § 132.03.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
144. 13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 133.01 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of
Statutory Exemptions of Proceeds of Workers’ Compensation Awards, 48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997).
145. 8 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 93.01(1)(a) (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
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the possibility of not recovering wage-loss benefits be an acceptable risk
because the claim is tenuous? After all, in a legitimate claim, benefits are
supposed to issue automatically.146 Not quite: under employer-provided
healthcare coverage, the employee pays any deductible, co-insurance, or copay out of pocket as specified by the plan. Under compensation coverage, the
employee does not pay any medical expenses out of pocket, so long as the
expenses are “reasonable and necessary” and caused by the work injury.147 So,
the employee is in a comparatively worse position if he is covered only by the
healthcare plan. Also, there is still the same need to obtain “prompt,
equitable, and adequate benefits” whether or not a portion of those benefits
has already been paid.148
The court in Tackett, which held that an ERISA plan could obtain a full
reimbursement from a workers’ compensation settlement, felt that the
injured worker’s quandary would have been obviated had he invited the
health plan to the negotiation table.149 However, this is not always the case.
After McCutchen, a health plan armed with favorable terms has no legal
obligation to reduce the amount of its lien against a workers’ compensation
settlement. Accordingly, an injured worker has no leverage by which to
ensure that he can recover at least some ultimate recovery from the
compensation insurer.
V. ASCERTAINING THE PARAMETERS OF APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE
REIMBURSEMENT
Although some might call it a fool’s errand, determining whether
requested relief is equitable requires determining what relief a court of equity
could provide.150 That analysis requires more than citing cases that effectively
grant a means to enforce the written terms of a contract. In Sereboff, the
146. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
147. 8 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 94.03(1) (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
148. See supra note 43.
149. Graphic Commc’ns Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Tackett, No. 07-CV-0123-MJR,
2008 WL 2020504, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 9, 2008).
150. This is the starting point of the inquiry, but it is not the end. “[The Supreme Court]
ha[s] long rejected the argument that ‘equitable relief’ under § 502(a)(3) [codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)] means ‘whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular
case at issue,’ including ancillary legal remedies.’” Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator
Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 660 (2016) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 256 (1993)). The remedy must be distinctively equitable. Historically, equity courts
could award distinctively legal relief as part of their ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 661. According
to the Supreme Court, these distinctively legal remedies are not authorized by 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3). Id.
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Court found that Mid Atlantic sought to enforce a lien based on an
agreement.151 In McCutchen, the Court looked exclusively to the plan terms
to determine the parties’ agreement, saying “if the agreement governs, the
agreement governs.”152 But to ascertain the true nature of an agreement, a
court of equity will ultimately look to the intent of the parties.153
A.

The Adhesive Nature of an ERISA Plan

According to McCutchen, express terms of the contract prevail over
background equitable principles.154 But would a court of equity enforce a
provision in health plan boilerplate language when the party against whom
the provision is enforced could not reasonably have understood its impact?
1.

Adhesion Contracts

When obtaining employer-provided health care, an employee is faced
with a take-it-or-leave-it contract. The provisions contained within the fine
print of an employee fringe benefit are not dickered terms. The plan
sponsor—the employer—“unilaterally set[s the plan] terms,” including
subrogation and reimbursement provisions.155 This sort of contract acquired
the label “adhesion contract” in the twentieth century after the industrial
revolution prompted the ubiquity of take-it-or-leave-it form contracts.156
Raymond Saleilles, who coined the term, defined an adhesion contract as
“preformulated stipulations in which the offeror’s will is predominant and
the conditions are dictated to an undetermined number of acceptants and
not to one individual party.”157 Characteristics added by later commentators
include:
(a) [T]he continuing and general nature of the offer, (b) the
monopolistic position or at least the great economic power
of the offeror, (c) a widespread demand for the goods or
services offered, and (d) the use of standard forms of type
contracts, the stipulations of which serve mostly the interests

151. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006).
152. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 99 (2013).
153. See infra Section V.B.
154. McCutchen, 569 U.S. at 103.
155. Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM.
BUS. L.J. 599, 661 (2018).
156. Vera Bolgár, The Contract of Adhesion – A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20
AM. J. COMP. L. 53, 55 (1972).
157. Id. at 54.
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of the offeror and the reading, let alone the understanding of
which, presents difficulties to the offeree.158
There can be no doubt that the terms of an employee fringe benefit fall
squarely within this definition. The ERISA plan sponsor, the employer, offers
healthcare as a fringe benefit to whomever it determines is eligible. The
employee has no negotiating power over the ERISA plan’s terms and must
take them as they are to receive benefits for medical care, a most basic and
widespread human need.159 Unless the offeree–employee happens to be a
lawyer familiar with equitable defenses, the offeree doubtlessly has difficulty
in reading and understanding what a plan means when it excludes the madewhole rule and the common-fund doctrine within its subrogation provision.
The presence of an adhesion contract in contract enforcement is relevant
for two broad reasons: a contract’s validity according to the adhering party’s
assent thereto, and public policy that shields an adhering party from the form
contract’s consequences.160 The official comment to the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) section on unconscionability summarizes the
public policy as “the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not
of disturbance of [the] allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power.”161 But the bar is high for a court to find a signed contract
unconscionable, and courts are reluctant to interfere with express terms.162
Under the unconscionability section of the UCC, courts have voided all or
part of a contract if there was manifest unreasonableness, oppression, unfair
surprise, inconsistency with the contract’s context, fine print obscuring
disclaimers, parties’ expectations contrary to the terms, or impairment of
previous agreements.163
2.

In Framing “Equitable Relief” Under ERISA, the Supreme
Court Has Not Considered the Adhesiveness of ERISA Plans

When the Supreme Court approved the validity of enforcing an equitable
lien by agreement under ERISA, the two cases it relied upon “from the days
of the divided bench” involved contracting parties exercising much more
autonomy than an employee does in signing a form contract from a plan

158. Id.
159. Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 518–19 (2015).
160. Bolgár, supra note 156, at 55.
161. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
162. Bolgár, supra note 156, at 71.
163. Id. at 73.
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sponsor.164 In Barnes v. Alexander, two attorneys performed work for Barnes,
who agreed to pay “one-third of the contingent fee” that he was to receive.165
This created a lien that the other attorneys could recover once Barnes had the
identified fund in his hands.166 The bargain between the two attorneys was an
archetypical arm’s-length business transaction. In Walker v. Brown, Brown
transferred bonds worth $15,000 in order to assist the corporation Lloyd &
Co.167 In order to facilitate business with a supplier, Brown agreed that the
bonds would function as security for any debt the supplier had against Lloyd
& Co.168 This, too, was an arm’s-length transaction, established by a letter
created for the purpose, and not by Brown adhering to a complex and lengthy
set of terms as is found in an ERISA plan.
The Supreme Court in McCutchen pointed out that the defendant (against
whom the insurer sought reimbursement) and the United States as amicus
curiae “fail[ed] to produce a single case in which an equity court applied
[equitable defenses] when a contract provided to the contrary. . . . [A]ll
provisions of [an] agreement controlled.”169 This reasoning is circular. The
question is not whether equitable defenses should apply contrary to the
agreement, but what terms constitute the actual agreement. When a health
plan expressly excludes the common-fund rule and the made-whole doctrine,
in as many words, has an employee truly agreed that he will reimburse the
health plan out of any worker’s compensation settlement he receives,
regardless of how much of that settlement represented past medical
expenses? Unless the employee is well-acquainted with the meaning of
equitable defenses or consults a lawyer before agreeing to employer-provided
healthcare, the contention that he has made such an agreement is incredible.
An employee, even one who scrupulously reads an employer-provided
health plan’s terms, might be surprised to learn that some of those terms
impaired the ability to receive workers’ compensation relief.170 The context
of entering the health plan agreement is that of an employment relationship,
which in all fifty states includes both the state-mandated fringe benefit of
compensation for a work injury and the ability to contest a right to relief after
an initial claim has been denied. Both parties—the employee and the plan
164. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
165. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 121 (1914).
166. Id. at 123.
167. Walker v. Brown, 165 U.S. 654, 655 (1897).
168. Id. at 663.
169. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 100 (2013).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 91 and 97 for the plan reimbursement language
from McCutchen and Tackett.
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sponsor—have the expectation of workers’ compensation in the background,
even though the plan terms do not mention it.
ERISA authorizes “appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce any
provisions of . . . the terms of the plan.”171 The appropriate equitable relief
authorized under ERISA ought to be enforcement of the terms of the plan
insofar as they reflect the agreement of the parties. When a plaintiff seeks to
enforce a plan term, the nature of the underlying remedy sought is not
equitable if the manner of the enforcement cuts against the intent of the
parties in coming to an agreement.
B.

Equitable Maxims Applied to an ERISA Plan Agreement

Judicial recognition of adhesion contracts, as well as the UCC, arose
largely after the merger of the courts of law and equity. But the principles in
play are well known to equity. The system of equity was founded “upon the
eternal verities of right and justice” as condensed into ordered principles.172
Equitable maxims are pithy statements embodying the principles underlying
equitable jurisprudence.173 Two equitable maxims, “equity regards that as
done which ought to be done” and “equity looks to the intent rather than to
the form,” are inextricably related.174 Equity must look to the intent and not
merely to the form to ascertain what ought to be done.175
Equity always attempts to get at the substance of things, and
to ascertain, uphold, and enforce rights and duties which
spring from the real relations of the parties. It will never
suffer the mere appearance and external form to conceal the
true purposes, objects, and consequences of a transaction.176
Equitable liens arise from the operation of these two maxims. At law, a
contract action could give, at most, a remedy of damages, while equity gives
effect to the real intent of the parties by giving a lien upon specific property
of the promisor.177 The Supreme Court decisions in Great-West and

171.
172.
2002).
173.
2002).
174.
2002).
175.
176.
177.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
1 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59, at 75–76 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 360, at 4–5 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 41 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. § 380 at 44.
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Montanile denying reimbursement to health plans relied upon this aspect of
equitable liens.178
Another maxim of equity, “he who seeks equity must do equity,” expresses
the foundational principle that a court of equity must determine rights and
remedies in accordance with conscience and good faith.179 Application of the
maxim takes the more specific sense that in granting equitable relief, the
court must acknowledge and concede all the equitable rights that belong to
the defendant and relate to the controversy at hand.180 Relief is conditional
upon the plaintiff giving the defendant any corresponding equitable rights.181
For the equity belonging to the defendant to sufficiently “relate to” the relief
sought by the plaintiff, it must “grow[] out of the very controversy before the
court, or out of such transactions as the record shows to be a part of its
history.”182
When a court grants equitable relief in the form of reimbursement to a
health plan, it ought to take into account the equities of the plan participant.
Here, the situation of an injured worker who has obtained a workers’
compensation settlement diverges from the cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court, where the party against whom reimbursement is sought has obtained
a third-party tort settlement. The right to retain the proceeds of a third-party
tort settlement does not arise out of any relationship between the plan
participant and the health plan. The tort settlement contract is between the
injured party and the tortfeasor. That transaction is not part of the history of
any controversy between the employee and the employer. In contrast, the
right to workers’ compensation benefits certainly is part of that history. The
employment relationship is the critical link.
The operation of state law creates an implicit term in every employment
contract that a worker has a right to receive wage-loss benefits and medical
treatment for a work-related injury. The employer is obligated to provide
those benefits, even though it usually shifts the burden of fulfilling that
obligation to an insurer. A settlement agreement between the insurer and
employee binds the employer: “the insurer is the employer’s alter ego.”183 An
178. Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651,
660 (2016); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002).
179. 2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 51 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
180. Id. at 51–52.
181. Id. at 52.
182. Id. § 387 at 59.
183. 13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 132.06(2) (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
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employer must abide by the terms of a settlement agreement even if it is not
directly a party to the agreement.
When an employee contracts to receive ERISA-governed health benefits,
the bargain is with the employer. ERISA only governs benefit plans that are
“maintained by the employer.”184 Even though a plan administrator seeking
reimbursement acts as a fiduciary for (i.e., on behalf of) the plan and its
beneficiaries, ignoring the employment origin of the healthcare plan would
be ignoring the “real relations of the parties.”185 Commentators have made
much of the distinction between a plan settlor186 and a plan fiduciary for
purposes of determining a breach of fiduciary duty.187 Generally speaking,
that distinction is relevant for the purposes of whether an employer, as plan
sponsor, breaches any fiduciary duty under ERISA by amending the plan. But
a plan fiduciary, in enforcing an existing plan, must abide by the terms of the
plan as agreed between the employee–participant and the employer–sponsor.
The expectation of the employee to receive, and of the employer to pay,
workers’ compensation benefits lurks in the background of that agreement.
VI. EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE WORKER’S QUAGMIRE
When Congress passed ERISA, it did so to protect employee benefits.188
Congress could not have foreseen ERISA’s collateral interference with wellestablished employee benefit schemes. But until Congress issues a legislative
remedy, injured workers must make do with judicial ones. To counter a
health plan’s action to enforce an equitable lien against a workers’
compensation settlement under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), an employee could
raise several defenses. First, the health plan’s terms should be construed or
reformed so as not to extend the right of reimbursement to the proceeds of a
workers’ compensation settlement because the employer itself, not a third
party, paid the settlement. Second, the health plan should be estopped by the
terms of the settlement.

184. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012).
185. 2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 41 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002) (emphasis in original).
186. The plan sponsor, i.e., the employer, who funds the plan and writes its terms. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) defines “settlor” as “[s]omeone who makes a settlement of
property; esp., one who sets up a trust.”
187. Muir & Stein, supra note 159, at 478.
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). “The overarching theme of ERISA was to protect
reasonable employee benefit expectations.” Muir & Stein, supra note 159, at 521.
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Properly Construing the ERISA Plan Agreement

When a health plan seeks to enforce its right of reimbursement against a
participant who has received a third-party settlement, it asks the court for
“appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the plan.”189 The
terms of the plan are contained within the plan documents.190 The
appropriate equitable relief to enforce those terms is indistinguishable from
an equitable lien by agreement.191 Therefore, the party who seeks
enforcement of the plan terms may obtain relief to the extent that an
agreement giving effect to the plan terms exists.
1.

Enforcement of Contracts in Equity

The touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the parties—
“equity regards substance rather than form.”192 While the law “holds parties
strictly and literally” to the exact words of an agreement, the considerations
of equity in contract enforcement are different than those at law.193
Reformation of a contract is an ordinary power of equity, which regards
reformation as a “preparatory step” that “establishes the real contract.”194 In
order for a court of equity to reform a contract, a party must show either a
mutual mistake, where the written contract does not reflect the actual
agreement (the “meeting of the minds”); or a “mistake of one party” along
with inequitable conduct or fraud of the other parties.195 In equity, a mistake
means a mental error, induced by a misunderstanding of the truth, but short
of negligence.196 A mistake may be of fact or of law. A mistake of law can take
two forms: a party might be ignorant about his existing legal rights but fully
understand the effect of the transaction at issue, or a party might be correct
about existing legal rights and be mistaken about the effect upon them of the

189. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
191. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006).
192. 2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 378, at 40 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
193. 4 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1297 at 857 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
194. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 441 (2011) (citing 4 POMEROY’S EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1375, at 999 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 2002)).
195. 4 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1376, at 1000–01 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th
ed. 2002).
196. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 839, at 284–85 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th
ed. 2002).
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transaction into which he enters.197 A court of equity might hesitate to grant
relief for a unilateral “pure and simple” mistake of law, but the balance of
justice inclines toward one who is mistaken when the mistake is accompanied
by another’s inequitable conduct.198 Such inequitable conduct need not be
intentionally misleading.199 Equity will not aid a party who knows of
another’s mistake and does not correct it, or who induces a mistake by
“misrepresentation, imposition, concealment, undue influence, breach of
confidence reposed, mental weakness, or surprise.”200
In the days of the divided bench, adhesion contracts were not yet wellrecognized. But equity’s treatment of mistakes of law foreshadowed the
judicial scrutiny applied to agreements wherein one party has little to no
negotiating power and must conform to the agreement as drafted by the
stronger party. The contemporary rule is adhesion contracts are enforceable
unless unconscionable.201 To avoid a contract on grounds of
unconscionability, a party must show that he lacked a meaningful choice and
that the terms unreasonably favored the drafting party.202 The comment to
the UCC unconscionability provision notes that courts have indirectly
policed unconscionable contracts by adverse construction of language.203 The
rule of adverse construction, “in dubio contra proferentem (the terms are
interpreted against the drafting party),” applies to ambiguous terms in a
contract of adhesion.204 The overarching goal of courts in enforcing adhesion
contracts is “vindication of the free will of the individual,” in consideration
of fairness and equity.205
2.

Application to ERISA Plan Reimbursement Language

To aid in the task of interpreting reimbursement language, consider this
sample subrogation and reimbursement language from the Employer’s Guide
to Self-Insuring Health Benefits:
Another party may be liable or legally responsible for
expenses incurred by a covered person for an illness, a
197. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 841, at 288 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
198. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 847, at 304–05 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th
ed. 2002).
199. Id. at 304.
200. Id. at 305.
201. E.g., Smith, Bucklin & Assocs. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
202. Id.
203. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
204. Bolgár, supra note 156, at 76–77.
205. Id. at 78.
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sickness or a bodily injury. Benefits may also be payable
under this Plan for such expenses.
....
By accepting benefits the plan participant agrees the Plan
shall have an equitable lien on any funds received by the plan
participant and/or their attorney from any source and said
funds shall be held in trust until such time as the obligations
under this provision are fully satisfied.
....
As a condition to participating in and receiving benefits
under the Plan, the plan participant agrees to assign to the
plan the right to subrogate and pursue any and all claims.
The Company may, at its option:
• take over the covered person’s right to receive payment
of the benefits from the third party.
....
• recover from the plan participant any benefits paid
under the Booklet [SPD] which the plan participant is
entitled to receive from another party. The company will
have a first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement,
judgment or otherwise, that the covered person receives
from: (1) the responsible party; (2) the third party’s insurer
or guarantor; (3) the plan participant’s uninsured or
underinsured motorist insurance; (4) any first party
insurance through medical payment coverage, personal
injury protection, no-fault coverage; (5) worker’s
compensation; or (6) any other source, including but not
limited to any school insurance coverage.
This lien will be for the amount of benefits paid by the
Company for the treatment of the illness or bodily injury for
which the third party is liable or legally responsible. If the
Covered Person: (1) makes any recovery as set forth in this
provision; and (2) fails to reimburse the Company fully for
any benefits paid under this provision; then he will be
personally liable to the Company to the extent of such
recovery up to the amount of the first lien. The Covered
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Person must cooperate fully with the Company in asserting
its right to recover.206
Although not included within its sample language, the explanation thereof
recommends that “[t]he plan language should specifically reject the ‘madewhole rule’ and ‘common-fund doctrine.’”207 Similarly to the plan language
in McCutchen, this sample language provides an allocation formula
contradicting the equitable double-recovery rule, which would have given the
plan participant “first dibs” on the portion of a third-party recovery
compensating for losses not covered by the plan.208 Here, the plan has a lien
on “any funds received . . . from any source,” the plan shall recover “any
benefits paid” out of “any recovery,” and the amount of the lien equals “the
amount of benefits paid.”
The context of the ERISA plan agreement is critical to understanding its
content. The immediate context is an employment relationship; by
definition, ERISA only governs plans “maintained by an employer.”209 An
employer offers health coverage to qualifying employees as an integral part
of a compensation package: the expense of health benefits is far too great to
be a mere gratuity. An employee, seeking to avoid incurring the expense of
maintaining his own health coverage, must take or leave the terms of the plan
as the employer gives them. An employee’s negotiating power may extend to
salary amount, the duration of an employment contract, and perhaps even to
a few other particulars. As far as health coverage, an employee may have a
choice of insuring either himself or his whole family and might be able to
select from a menu of deductible or co-insurance options. By no means does
an employee have the power to pick and choose contract boilerplate terms. A
reimbursement provision is thus an imposition.
The language of most reimbursement provisions invites a mistake of law
on the part of the contracting employee. In all fifty states, an employee and
an employer enter their relationship according to the terms of the grand
bargain of workers’ compensation210 wherein an employee has a right to
prompt relief for a work-related injury or disease, and an employer is free
from claims of negligence and accompanying tort damages. This implicit
agreement constitutes the parties’ existing legal rights before entering the
206. EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO SELF-INSURING HEALTH BENEFITS ¶ 720 (database updated Mar.
2016); see also text accompanying notes 91 and 97 for the plan reimbursement language from
McCutchen and Tackett.
207. Id.
208. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 103 (2013).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012).
210. See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text.

2020]

PHENOMENAL COSMIC POWERS

145

health plan agreement. Even if a diligent employee were to read the contract
boilerplate, he would be mistaken as to the effect the contract would have on
his existing legal rights.
First, in the sample language excerpted above, reimbursement of a health
plan depends upon another party becoming responsible for expenses
incurred. This recalls the reimbursement language from McCutchen, which
referred to the “negligence” or “willful misconduct” of “a third party.”211 Yet
workers’ compensation benefits are not derived from another party. The
employer is obligated to pay workers’ compensation benefits, just as the
employer is the offeror of the health plan to which the employee must adhere.
Secondly, the employee might be mistaken as to the extent of the plan’s
lien. In order to defeat the gist of the double-recovery rule, the language is
not clear on exactly what funds the plan is entitled to enforce its lien against.
Though the introductory language says that “[a]nother party may be . . .
responsible for expenses incurred . . . for an illness, a sickness, or a bodily
injury,” the plan has a lien on funds “from any source.” The lien is upon “any
recovery” from five enumerated sources or from “any other source.” Under
this language, an enterprising plan might pursue a lien against a participant’s
wages or against an inheritance. Such a right would, of course, be manifestly
unreasonable. A reasonable interpretation would link “another party[’s]”
responsibility “for an illness, a sickness, or a bodily injury” with the plan’s
right to “recover . . . any benefits paid . . . which the plan participant is entitled
to receive from another party.” Such an interpretation would mirror the
double-recovery rule, wherein a right of reimbursement only applies to the
amount of a recovery that compensated for the covered loss. The effect of the
above-quoted reimbursement provision upon the employee’s existing legal
rights is that any compensation benefits representing lost wages or future
medical expenses would be subject to health plan reimbursement, along with
the portion representing past medical expenses.
A court of equity might not reform a contract if a mistake of law is merely
unilateral, but it would do so if the other party knows of the mistake and does
not correct it, or induces it by “misrepresentation, imposition, concealment,
undue influence, breach of confidence reposed, mental weakness, or
surprise.”212 The sample language above seeks to exclude the made-whole rule
by defining the amount of the lien as the amount of benefits paid. This
language suggests a link between the lien and the benefits paid, and thus to
the portion of the recovered funds representing such benefits. Much clearer
211. McCutchen, 569 U.S. at 92.
212. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 847, at 305 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
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language would express the fact that the plan may recover against the
participant regardless of whether the funds sought were actually
compensation for the loss that the paid benefits covered. The ambiguity as to
a third-party recovery and as to the funds that the lien seeks constitutes a
misrepresentation and concealment of the participant’s rights under the
agreement. The unsuspecting employee is faced with an unenviable choice:
either to accept coverage for the basic human need of healthcare at the risk
of compromising compensation benefits, or to preserve state-mandated
compensation benefits by rejecting health coverage. This is not a meaningful
choice.
If a court of equity were to reform the plan contract, it must do so with
regard to the rights of both parties, for “[e]quity suffers not a right to be
without a remedy.”213 Equity should preserve a right to reimbursement for
the plan, while recognizing a corresponding right in the participant to retain
compensation payments made by the employer that represented losses other
than those which the employer’s health plan covered.
B.

Estopping the Plan from Asserting Its Right to Recovery

When an ERISA plan seeks to enforce a lien against a workers’
compensation settlement, the participant could argue that the plan should be
estopped from doing so. As the Supreme Court has noted in an ERISA
remedies case, estoppel is another traditional equitable remedy, alongside
contract reformation.214 Equitable estoppel is defined as the preclusion of a
party, by the party’s own conduct, from asserting rights against another
person who has relied on such conduct and changed his position so as to
acquire some corresponding right.215 In equity, satisfaction of the elements of
fraud is not required for estoppel, though, in a sense, a party’s assertion of
rights contradicting his former conduct is a fraud upon the rights of the
person benefitted by the estoppel.216
A workers’ compensation settlement often maintains the denial of the
claim in exchange for the release of the employer’s liability. The terms of the
settlement may admit that the employer’s health plan has paid medical
expenses for the employee’s injuries while denying that the settlement
213. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440 (2011) (quoting R. FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF
EQUITY 29 (1st Am. ed. 1823)).
214. Id. at 441.
215. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804, at 189 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
216. 3 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 803, at 184–85 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th
ed. 2002).
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compensates for those injuries. The parties to a settlement make these
stipulations in order to circumvent state laws prohibiting waiver of statutory
compensation rights: if a settlement is made for less than the full statutory
benefits (which, by definition, a settlement is), then that agreement would be
invalid.217 The employer’s offer of payment, along with stipulations
preventing the invalidity of the agreement, induces the employee to accept
the settlement. The employee, in accepting the settlement, changes his
position because, in releasing the employer from compensation liability, he
is no longer entitled to full statutory benefits. The employer has satisfied the
elements of equitable estoppel such that, when seeking to enforce its right of
reimbursement, the employer’s health plan should be estopped by its
stipulation in the compensation settlement that the payment did not
compensate for any injury or medical expenses.
An ERISA plan participant and workers’ compensation claimant made an
estoppel argument in Brantley v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc.218 The ERISAgoverned plan was a long-term disability plan rather than a healthcare plan.219
The participant settled a workers’ compensation claim for about $35,000 to
be “spread out over his actuarial life.”220 According to the settlement, “the set
off for . . . disability benefits shall be $72.66 per month.”221 The long-term
disability plan administrator reduced the payments by $1,000, the full
amount of payable benefits, in order to offset the workers’ compensation
settlement in thirty-five months.222 The participant–claimant sued the
employer and its plan’s administrator under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),
contending inter alia that the defendants were estopped to renounce the
settlement’s disability set off limitation.223 The court gave two reasons for
denying estoppel. First, the plan’s claim administrator was not a party to the
settlement agreement.224 Second, although the employer was a party to the
settlement, it was so only in its capacity as employer and not in its ERISA
fiduciary capacity.225 The court explained that, with respect to an employer’s
217. 13 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 132.03 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
218. Brantley v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
219. Id. at 907.
220. Id. at 908.
221. Id. (citation omitted).
222. Id. at 909.
223. Brantley v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 903, 912 (E.D. Tenn. 2010);
Complaint at ¶ 22, Brantley v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)
(No. 3:09CV00470), 2009 WL 6825061.
224. Brantley, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
225. Id.

148

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

ERISA plan, the employer has two hats; only when the employer’s actions
constitute “managing” or “administering” a plan does it wear its ERISA hat.226
The Brantley court concluded, without analysis, that the employer was not
managing or administering the disability plan when it agreed to the workers’
compensation settlement. An ERISA fiduciary is statutorily defined as any
person who exercises any discretionary authority or control over
management of the plan or its assets.227 Courts distinguish between actions
that constitute managing or administering a plan and actions that are mere
business decisions that affect the plan: the decision “to amend or terminate a
welfare benefits plan” is not a fiduciary one.228 Plan design and termination
are not fiduciary acts, but the implementation of those decisions are fiduciary
acts.229 When an employer communicates with employees about plan
benefits, it acts as a fiduciary; reasonable employees would assume that the
employer is acting as administrator of the plan.230 Contrary to the Brantley
court’s conclusion that the employer did not act in a fiduciary role in making
the compensation settlement, the employer’s agreement regarding a set-off
limitation for disability benefits could be interpreted as a communication
about the disability plan’s benefits. Similarly, an employer’s acknowledgment
in a workers’ compensation settlement of medical benefits paid by its
healthcare plan, along with its agreement that none of the settlement
represents medical benefits, might be understood as a discretionary act of
control over the healthcare plan’s assets. Thus, the employer would be acting
on behalf of the plan; any other plan administrator, as an alter ego of the
employer, would be estopped by the employer’s representations.
The Brantley case differs in other key respects from a suit by a healthcare
plan to enforce a reimbursement provision. In Brantley, the participant sued
the plan and not vice versa. The participant sued under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B), which allows a participant “to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”231 That
cause of action does not contain the “appropriate equitable relief” language
of § 1132(a)(3), under which the Supreme Court in Mertens limited relief to
226. Id. (quoting Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 1998)).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2017).
228. Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sutter v. BASF
Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1992)).
229. Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 485 (2015).
230. Id. at 489 (discussing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2017).
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the categories typically available in equity, and thereby began the line of cases
conducting a historical equitable analysis.232 When a party brings suit for
appropriate equitable relief, a court must necessarily ask whether “he who
comes into equity [has] come with clean hands.”233
C.

The Likelihood of Success of the Participant’s Arguments

Given the current state of ERISA law, courts are unlikely to ratify any
agreement that differs in any respect from the plan documents. Courts have
inferred reasons for exclusive reliance on plan documents not expressed by
Congress’s official statement of policy in ERISA. Employers can insert plan
provisions that make traditional contractual construction impossible. The
history of ERISA litigation demonstrates an inexorable pattern of deference
to plan sponsors and administrators. Congress should amend or supersede
ERISA with legislation that prevents ERISA plans from interfering with
established employment benefits.
1.

Courts Are Unwilling to Enforce Anything Other Than Plan
Documents

The Supreme Court ratified the equitable power to reform an ERISA plan
in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara.234 In Amara, however, the power to reform
extended to enforcing benefits under a prior version of the plan when
participants had insufficient notice of plan changes.235 Courts have repeatedly
made written plan terms the be-all-end-all of employment fringe benefits:
ERISA “is built around reliance on the face of written plan documents.”236
ERISA requires that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”237 That requirement is
supposed to make employee benefit plans predictable and certain.238 Courts
infer that Congress’s intent was that plan documents should “exclusively
govern . . . employers’ obligations.”239 Allowing informal plan amendments
would disincentivize employers to offer benefits.240 Altering a plan based on

232.
233.
2002).
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra Section III.A.
2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397, at 90 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440–41 (2011).
Id. at 424–25.
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995).
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2017).
Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).
Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988).
Sprague, 133 F.3d at 403.
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communications outside the plan documents “would undermine ERISA.”241
Strict adherence to plan documents, without examining other expressions of
the parties’ intent, promotes simple administration.242 If plan administrators
must look outside the plan documents to determine how to distribute
benefits, they will become embroiled in disputes and be dragged into court.243
Tempering relief according to equitable principles by limiting the reach of
an ERISA plan’s right of reimbursement does not undermine ERISA.
Congress specified that its intent in establishing ERISA was to prevent
employees and their beneficiaries from being “deprived of anticipated
benefits.”244 Congress specifically excluded workers’ compensation from
ERISA coverage.245 Although preventing an ERISA plan from obtaining the
wage-loss portion of workers’ compensation benefits does diminish the sum
of assets in the plan’s coffer, “[a]ny overpayments received by participants
typically are small relative to the size of the plan.”246 The marginal effect of
reducing recovery against workers’ compensation settlements is not a serious
threat to a plan’s financial integrity.
Furthermore, limiting reimbursement in accordance with the parties’
intent does not entail the administrative burden that distributing benefits
according to external agreements would. Distributing benefits is the normal
course of an administrator’s business and does not necessitate disputes or
negotiations. When an administrator seeks reimbursement, it is the one
instigating litigation. It would not be burdensome to follow a bright-line rule
that only the “past medical expense” portion of benefits are available for
reimbursement when those benefits are paid by the same employer whose
plan seeks reimbursement.
2.

ERISA Plans Are Exempt from Judicial Interpretation

Although an ERISA plan is a contract of adhesion, federal courts resist
construing ERISA plan terms in favor of plan participants.247 The reason
courts typically interpret contracts de novo is that courts presume both

241. Moore, 856 F.2d at 489.
242. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009).
243. Id.
244. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2017).
245. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (2017).
246. Dana Muir, From Schism to Prism: Equitable Relief in Employee Benefit Plans, 55 AM.
BUS. L.J. 599, 662 (2018).
247. Muir & Stein, supra note 229, at 519.
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contracting parties acted in self-interest when making the plan.248 In an
adhesion contract, the adhering party is unable to act in self-interest, thus
giving rise to the rule of contra proferentem.249 The Supreme Court has
authorized plan sponsors to include terms giving a plan administrator
discretionary authority to construe the plan itself.250 This ability, along with
reservation-of-rights clauses, limits judicial review to an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard.251 An employer’s “unchecked and unreviewable” ability
to impose plan terms and interpret plan provisions is inconsistent with
Congress’s intent in establishing ERISA.252
Interpretation of plan provisions at the discretion of the employer
forecloses any argument that an employee’s understanding of the agreement,
or his pre-existing legal rights, is relevant to how far a right of reimbursement
extends under the plan terms. However, when a plan seeks reimbursement
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), a court should determine whether an
agreement exists that supports the plan terms. A court should exercise its
equitable power to examine the true nature of the agreement. When a plan
seeks to vindicate its nearly limitless power by obtaining equitable relief, it
must accept the inherent limitations of the equitable jurisdiction, for “he who
seeks equity must do equity.”253
3.

Congress Should Amend or Supersede ERISA

Congress’s explicit and implicit purposes in adopting ERISA are mired in
an array of conflicting judicial decisions.254 Congress should adopt legislation
protecting the full scope of employee benefits. Congress previously
attempted to adopt national standards for workers’ compensation law, but
existing state plans were too entrenched for federal standards to be politically
expedient.255 Congress should revisit workers’ compensation in order to
protect compensation benefits from its own interference by the effects of
248. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-Thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West—
Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare Benefit Claims, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 661 n.147 (2004).
249. See supra text accompanying note 204.
250. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989).
251. Muir & Stein, supra note 229, at 519, 526.
252. Id. at 521.
253. 2 POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 51 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
2002).
254. Dahlia Schwartz, Breathing Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a Reconciliation
of ERISA’s Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena, 79 B.U. L. REV. 631, 659 (1999).
255. 1 Lex K. Larson, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed. 2018).
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ERISA. The task would not be impossible; for example, the Americans with
Disability Act prohibits discrimination and supersedes ERISA.256 Congress
can vindicate its objective of preventing deprivation of employees’
anticipated benefits without upsetting the protections that ERISA has
established.

256. Schwartz, supra note 254.

